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United States v. Hotal: Determining the Role of 
Conditions Precedent in the Constitutionality of 
Anticipatory Warrants 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, I received a very interesting package in a post of-
fice box. Along with the usual mail, there was a ten-by-thirteen 
inch brown envelope in a clear plastic bag. The bag containing 
the envelope stated that the item had been damaged by sorting 
machinery and offered the apologies of the United States Postal 
Service. A stamped message on the envelope read: “Return to 
Sender, Address Does Not Exist.” Knowing that I had not sent 
the envelope but recognizing a poor attempt at spelling the 
name of the company I worked for in the return address, I 
opened it to find out whose mail it actually was. To my sur-
prise, the envelope contained two pounds of compressed mari-
juana wrapped in numerous layers of plastic. I waited for my 
attorney to arrive at my apartment and then turned the con-
traband over to the local police. Although my apartment was 
never searched, I will never forget the anxiety I experienced 
while still in possession of the marijuana, wondering if the po-
lice were going to kick in my door at any moment. 
This experience gave me an insight into the sense of secu-
rity the Fourth Amendment affords law-abiding citizens every 
day by prohibiting unjustified police intrusions. But not every-
one who receives two pounds of marijuana in their mailbox 
does so by accident. As to those individuals who purposely re-
ceive contraband in the mail, society has an interest in making 
sure that they are apprehended and convicted. 
Under traditional search warrant analysis, when law en-
forcement officials become aware of contraband in transit to a 
location, they have two options: they can either wait until the 
contraband is delivered before attempting to obtain and exe-
cute a search warrant, or they can perform the search based 
upon the “exigent circumstances” exception to the warrant re-
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quirement, and seize the contraband upon its arrival.1 Neither 
is an ideal option. If officers wait until the contraband is deliv-
ered to the premises before attempting to obtain a search war-
rant, the evidence could be destroyed or distributed before the 
warrant is issued and executed.2 If, on the other hand, they 
perform a search based on exigent circumstances, a court might 
find that no exigent circumstance existed, and consequently 
suppress the evidence.3 
In response to this catch-22, modern warrant analysis al-
lows the issuance of an anticipatory warrant.4 An anticipatory 
warrant is issued prior to, but is not to be executed until after, 
the arrival of the contraband at the premises.5 While a tradi-
tional warrant is executed “forthwith,” an anticipatory warrant 
is executed at some time in the future, if at all. For example, 
instead of allowing law enforcement to search forthwith, the 
magistrate issuing an anticipatory warrant may require that a 
shipment of contraband currently in transit arrive at the de-
sired location before allowing the warrant to be executed. If the 
warrant is executed before the evidence has been delivered, or 
if the evidence is never delivered, the warrant is void.6 The 
events which must occur before the warrant can be executed, 
such as the arrival of contraband, are referred to as the war-
rant’s “triggering event[s]”7 or “conditions precedent.”8 
 
 1. See United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081, 1086 (10th Cir. 1997); United 
States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 2. See Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 10; United States v. Garcia 882 F.2d 699, 703 
(2d Cir. 1989). 
 3. See id. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 3.7(c), at 363 (3d ed. 1996) (“The warrant is obtained in advance of the 
anticipated time of delivery [of the evidence] so that it may be promptly executed when 
the delivery is made.”). 
 6. See Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702. The conditions precedent may not occur if, for 
example, upon attempting delivery of the contraband, law enforcement is informed that 
the person the package is addressed to has moved. 
 7. United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997); see also 
United States v. Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998); Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12 
(1st Cir. 1993). 
 8. See, e.g., Hotal, 143 F.3d at 1226 (requiring that package be received and 
taken into residence prior to warrant’s execution); United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 
955, 965 (1st Cir. 1994) (requiring delivery by mail to, and receipt by, Daniel Gendron 
of a specifically described parcel); Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 13 (invalidating an anticipa-
tory warrant where the sole condition precedent was receipt of the package by the de-
fendant without requiring that the package be received at the premises to be searched); 
Garcia, 882 F.2d at 704 (upholding an anticipatory warrant where its conditions prece-
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The virtue of the anticipatory warrant is that it eliminates 
law enforcement’s catch-22 while preserving Fourth Amend-
ment protections. Because police now can obtain a warrant in 
advance, they no longer are forced to choose between waiting 
for a warrant and proceeding warrantless. Moreover, citizens 
benefit through the neutral magistrate’s determination of 
probable cause and specific authorization of where to search 
and what to seize. 
Although federal courts generally accept the constitutional-
ity of anticipatory warrants,9 their place in the constitutional 
framework is not clearly established. Federal circuit decisions 
split as to whether an anticipatory warrant must give notice to 
officers and defendants by expressly stating upon its face the 
conditions upon which its execution is predicated (“particular-
ity approach”),10 or whether it is sufficient that a judge consider 
 
dent required only delivery of the contraband to the premises and not delivery to any 
specific individual). In general, it can probably be said that conditions precedent are 
merely a statement that the warrant cannot be executed until the contraband has ar-
rived at the premises which the warrant authorizes to be searched. 
 9. All of the circuits that have addressed the issue have held that anticipatory 
warrants are not per se unconstitutional. See Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 11; United 
States v. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 
969, 974-75 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 903 n.6 (11th Cir. 
1990); Garcia, 882 F.2d, at 703; United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 
1988); United States v. Goff, 681 F.2d 1238, 1240 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Lowe, 575 F.2d 1193, 1194 (6th. Cir. 1978); United States ex rel. Beal v. Skaff, 418 F.2d 
430, 432-33 (7th Cir. 1969). Several state courts have also upheld the constitutionality 
of anticipatory warrants. See Johnson v. State, 617 P.2d 1117 (Alaska 1980); State v. 
Cox, 522 P.2d 29 (Ariz. 1974); Commonwealth v. Soares, 424 N.E.2d 221 (Mass. 1981); 
People v. Glen, 282 N.E.2d 614 (N.Y. 1972). 
 10. This Note will repeatedly state that the particularity approach requires that 
conditions precedent appear on the face of the warrant. Of course, this statement is 
subject to the cure by affidavit doctrine which allows courts to consider in certain cir-
cumstances the specificity provided by the affidavit. See generally Larry EchoHawk & 
Paul EchoHawk, Curing a Search Warrant That Fails to Particularly Describe the 
Place to be Searched, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 1 (1998). However, cure by affidavit does not 
change the underlying requirement that the warrant “particularly describ[e] the place 
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The 
Ninth Circuit in United States v. Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998), clearly under-
stood this distinction when it first considered whether the affidavit could cure the war-
rant and then considered whether the Constitution required that conditions precedent 
appear on the face of the warrant. See id. at 1225-26. It is with this understanding that 
one must read the court’s holding that “in order to comply with the Fourth Amend-
ment, an anticipatory search warrant must either on its face or on the face of the ac-
companying affidavit, clearly, expressly, and narrowly specify the triggering event.” 
See id. at 1227. The portion of the holding stating that the conditions precedent must 
appear on the face of the warrant relates to the court’s consideration of a time-based 
particularity requirement. The portion of the holding which states “or on the face of the 
accompanying affidavit” relates to the court’s consideration of cure by affidavit. It is 
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the warrant’s conditions precedent in determining probable 
cause (“probable cause approach”).11 In United States v. Hotal,12 
the Ninth Circuit adopted a particularity approach, requiring 
that an “anticipatory search warrant must . . . on its face . . . 
clearly, expressly, and narrowly specify the triggering event.”13 
This Note agrees with the Ninth Circuit’s decision. Part II of 
this Note provides background on the Fourth Amendment and 
how the terms of the amendment apply to anticipatory war-
rants. Part III describes the facts of Hotal and outlines the 
court’s reasoning in reaching its conclusion. Part IV analyzes 
the particularity and probable cause approaches. Finally, part 
V concludes that the Ninth Circuit was correct in adopting the 
particularity approach. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A.  The Fourth Amendment 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
protects citizens from “unreasonable searches and seizures”14 
 
the purpose of this Note to consider the Constitutional issue of whether conditions 
precedent must appear on the face of the warrant. The issue of when an affidavit can 
cure a faulty warrant is left for another day. However, it must be admitted that due to 
the interaction of the two issues, the only time a court’s approach to conditions prece-
dent will be outcome determinative is when the warrant does not list the conditions 
precedent and the affidavit cannot be used to cure it. See, e.g., id. 
 11. Although there may be some problems with the Ninth Circuit’s categorization 
of the courts, see infra note 74, it is generally correct. In United States v. Hotal, 143 
F.3d 1223, the Ninth Circuit divided the courts into two groups: those that require the 
conditions precedent to appear on the face of the warrant, and those that do not. The 
court placed itself and the First Circuit in the category of those courts that require 
conditions precedent to appear on the face of the warrant. See Hotal, 143 F.3d at 1226 
(citing Gendron, 18 F.3d at 965 (1st Cir. 1994), for the proposition that the First Circuit 
had adopted the “on-the-face” requirement); but see United States v. Vigneau, 1999 WL 
508810, at n.8 (1st Cir. (R.I.)) (stating that the Ninth Circuit had misinterpreted its 
holding). The court placed the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits in 
the category of courts that do not require the conditions precedent to appear on the face 
of the warrant. See id. (citing United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 
1997); Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1086-87 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Moetamedi, 
46 F.3d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 
1993); United States v. Rey, 923 F.2d 1217, 1221 (6th Cir. 1991)). 
 12. 143 F.3d 1223 (1998). 
 13. Id. at 1227. For an explanation of the editing, see supra note 10. 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The full text of the amendment states: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
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by representatives15 of either the federal or state government.16 
Subject to few exceptions,17 a search can be conducted only pur-
suant to a validly issued search warrant.18 A warrant alone, 
however, is not enough. The framers recognized that a search 
pursuant to a warrant could violate personal rights as much as 
 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
Id. 
 15. Although this Note focuses on the Fourth Amendment’s role in law enforce-
ment, the protections of the Fourth Amendment also limit the activities of other gov-
ernmental actors such as school teachers. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 
(1985). 
[T]his Court has never limited the Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable 
searches and seizures to operations conducted by the police. Rather, the Court has 
long spoken of the Fourth Amendment’s strictures as restraints imposed upon 
‘governmental action’that is, ‘upon the activities of sovereign authority.’ Accord-
ingly, we have held the Fourth Amendment applicable to the activities of civil as 
well as criminal authorities: building inspectors, Occupational Safety and Health 
Act inspectors, and even firemen entering privately owned premises to battle a 
fire, are all subject to the restraints imposed by the Fourth Amendment. 
  . . . . 
  . . . If school authorities are state actors for purposes of the constitutional 
guarantees of freedom of expression and due process, it is difficult to understand 
why they should be deemed to be exercising parental rather than public authority 
when conducting searches of their students. 
Id. at 335-36 (citations omitted). 
 16. The Fourth Amendment originally acted as a limit only upon the activities of 
the federal government. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440 (1973). However, 
with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, the proscriptions of the Fourth 
Amendment have been applied to state government as well as the federal government. 
See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949) (“The security of one’s privacy against ar-
bitrary intrusion by the police—which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is ba-
sic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in ‘the concept of ordered liberty’ and as 
such enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause.”), overruled by 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the states). 
 17. See Michael J. Flannery, Note, “Bridged Too Far: Anticipatory Search War-
rants and the Fourth Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 781, 789-90 (1991); see, e.g., 
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (outlining the nature of the plain-view excep-
tion to the warrant requirement); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (recog-
nizing that the Court has “permitted exceptions when ‘special needs, beyond the nor-
mal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement 
impracticable’ ” (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concuring in judg-
ment))); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982) (holding that warrantless 
searches of automobiles are constitutional as long as the search is “based on facts that 
would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not actually been 
obtained”). 
 18. See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984) (“Prior decisions of this 
Court . . . have emphasized that exceptions to the warrant requirement are ‘few in 
number and carefully delineated.’ ” (quoting United States v. United States District 
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972))). 
HAM-FIN.DOC 4/10/00  1:14 PM 
1010 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
a search without a warrant.19 In explaining the framers’ con-
cerns with English warrant law, the Supreme Court noted that 
the general warrant specified only an offense . . . and left to 
the discretion of the executing officials the decision as to 
which persons should be arrested and which places should be 
searched. Similarly, the writs of assistance used in the Colo-
nies noted only the object of the search—any uncustomed 
goods—and thus left customs officials completely free to 
search any place where they believed such goods might be. 
The central objectionable feature of both warrants was that 
they provided no judicial check on the determination of the 
executing officials that the evidence available justified an in-
trusion into any particular home.20 
Therefore, the Fourth Amendment contains additional re-
quirements that define the nature of a warrant: “[N]o Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or af-
firmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.”21 These requirements 
further limit law enforcement authority by requiring independ-
ent judicial determination of probable cause and the appropri-
ate scope of the search. This “ensures that the search is care-
fully tailored to its justification, and does not resemble the 
wide-ranging general searches that the Framers intended to 
prohibit.”22 The additional protections which apply when a 
warrant is issued make the obtainment of a warrant a pre-
ferred practice; hence, courts have been willing to accept the 
idea of issuing anticipatory warrants rather than allowing the 
police to perform warrantless searches under the exigent cir-
cumstances exception.23 
B.  ANTICIPATORY SEARCH WARRANTS 
1.  Search Warrant Defined 
An anticipatory search warrant “is a warrant based upon 
 
 19. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981). 
 20. Id. 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 22. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 963 (1984). 
 23. See United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703 (2d Cir. 1989) (“Courts—
although not yet the Supreme Court, to be sure—have upheld the anticipatory war-
rant, in large part, because they see it as desirable, whenever possible, for police to ob-
tain judicial approval before searching private premises.”). 
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an affidavit showing probable cause that at some future time, 
but not presently, certain evidence of crime will be located at a 
specified place.”24 This type of warrant enables law enforce-
ment to do two important things: (1) obtain the search warrant 
before the evidence has reached the location to be searched and 
(2) search a premise as soon as the evidence reaches the loca-
tion. By allowing the police to do these two things, anticipatory 
search warrants eliminate a catch-22: “whether, on the one 
hand, to allow the delivery of contraband to be completed be-
fore obtaining a search warrant, thus risking the destruction or 
disbursement of evidence in the ensuing interval, or, on the 
other hand, seizing the contraband on its arrival without a 
warrant, thus risking suppression.”25 Recognizing that the pur-
poses of the Fourth Amendment are better served when the 
acts of law enforcement are reviewed by a neutral magistrate, 
courts have favored the policy of obtaining anticipatory war-
rants.26 Still, courts have had difficulty outlining Fourth 
Amendment anticipatory warrant requirements. 
2.  Anticipatory search warrants and the warrant requirements 
Even though the anticipatory search warrant is a special 
type of warrant, it is still a “warrant,” bound by the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirement that “no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause . . . and particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and . . . things to be seized.”27 These two re-
quirements, probable cause and particularity, generally apply 
to both anticipatory and traditional warrants; however, there 
are some special considerations. 
a.  The particularity requirement. The particularity re-
quirement demands that in order for a warrant to be valid, 
“nothing [can be] left to the discretion of the officer executing 
the warrant.”28 The warrant must contain a specific description 
 
 24. 2 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 3.7(c), at 362; see also Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702 (“An 
anticipatory warrant, by definition, is a warrant that has been issued before the neces-
sary events have occurred which will allow a constitutional search of the premises; if 
those events do not transpire, the warrant is void.”). 
 25. United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 26. See Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703. 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added); see Garcia, 882 F.2d at 704 (hold-
ing that “as with other search warrants, anticipatory warrants require that a magis-
trate give careful heed to the fourth amendment’s [particularity] requirement . . . .”). 
 28. Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976) (quoting Marron v. United 
States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)). 
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of which location can be searched and what items can be seized. 
This means, for example, that if contraband is in a building 
which police know or reasonably should know is divided into 
subunits, the warrant can authorize a search of only those 
units for which probable cause exists.29 Discretion cannot be 
given to the police to decide which units to search when they 
arrive on the premises. 
At least one court, however, has allowed for limited police 
discretion when issuing an anticipatory warrant for a multiunit 
dwelling. In United States v. Dennis,30 the Seventh Circuit up-
held an anticipatory warrant that described the place to be 
searched as the “first floor apartment or second floor apart-
ment depending on conditions being met which are expressed 
in the application.”31 The application affidavit requested “per-
mission to search the first floor apartment if and only if an oc-
cupant of that apartment accepts delivery or opens the package 
or the second floor apartment if and only if an occupant of the 
second floor accepts delivery or opens the package.”32 The court 
upheld the warrant even though the warrant obviously left 
some discretion to the executing officers in deciding which sub-
unit to search. Whether this type of discretion is appropriate in 
the context of an anticipatory warrant needs further considera-
tion before the anticipatory warrant is settled in constitutional 
law.33 
b.  The probable cause requirement. Anticipatory warrants 
also must meet the probable cause requirement. Most early ob-
jections to anticipatory warrants were based upon this re-
quirement. Two methods of attack commonly used by defen-
dants are (1) that the magistrate must have “probable cause to 
believe that the contraband to be seized is in the place to be 
searched at the time a warrant issues” and (2) that probable 
cause to search one place can never exist when the contraband 
 
 29. See Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 85 (1987). 
 30. 115 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 31. Id. at 529 n.1. 
 32. Id. at 528. Even though the warrant referred to the terms in the application, 
there was no evidence that the application actually accompanied the warrant to the 
scene of the search. The failure of the application, which contained the conditions, to 
accompany the warrant to the scene of the search may present a problem of its own. 
See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text. 
 33. For a discussion of what type of discretion, if any, should be allowed in the 
context of anticipatory warrants, see infra notes 112-19 and accompanying text. 
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is currently known to be located at another.34 At first glance 
the arguments may appear to be the same, but they are differ-
ent. The first argument deals with what the magistrate must 
believe, the second argument goes to how certain that belief 
must be, or in other words, what is probable cause. Despite 
these differences, the two contentions do have one thing in 
common—they both have been rejected by the federal circuit 
courts.35 
 (1) Probable cause to believe the contraband is at the 
targeted location of the search when the warrant is issued. The 
courts have noted that the Fourth Amendment does not ex-
pressly require that the evidence “presently be located at the 
premises to be searched.”36 Any such claim can only be implied 
from terms in the amendment.37 If the defendant claims that 
the requirement arises under the probable cause language of 
the Amendment, the issue merges into the question of what is 
probable cause, the focus of the second of two arguments dis-
cussed below. The only other potential source of this require-
ment is the unreasonableness clause. In response to this ap-
proach, courts have held that “[t]here is nothing unreasonable 
about authorizing a search for tomorrow, not today, when reli-
able information indicates that . . . the [evidence] will reach the 
house, not now, but then.”38 On the more practical side, courts 
have noted that all that has ever been required is that the evi-
dence likely will “be found at the described locus at the time of 
the search.”39 
If defendants rely on the probable cause language of the 
 
 34. United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 10 (1st Cir. 1993). 
 35. See id.; United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Washington, 852 F.2d 803, 804 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Lowe, 575 
F.2d 1193, 1194 (6th Cir. 1978). 
 36. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 10. 
 37. See United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 965 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that 
the Constitution requires that “a search must not be ‘unreasonable,’ and that warrants 
must be supported by ‘probable cause,’ ” but it does not require that the warrant be ex-
ecutable upon issuance (quoting U.S. CONST. amend IV)). 
 38. Id.; see also Lowe, 575 F.2d at 1194 (“Contraband does not have to be pres-
ently located at the place described in the warrant if there is probable cause to believe 
that it will be there when the search warrant is executed.”). 
 39. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 10 (emphasis omitted). Probable cause does not re-
quire a certainty that the evidence will be at the described location, it merely requires 
a probability that it will be at the location. See id. The Supreme Court has described 
the standard as one of a “fair probability that contraband . . . will be found in a particu-
lar place.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). 
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Fourth Amendment in arguing that evidence must be located 
on the premises when the warrant is issued, then the only is-
sue is when probable cause to issue a warrant really exists. If, 
on the other hand, defendants rely on the “unreasonable” lan-
guage, the present location of the evidence “is immaterial, so 
long as ‘there is probable cause to believe that it will be there 
when the search warrant is executed.’ ”40 In this case, the court 
must determine what constitutes probable cause that the evi-
dence will be at the specified location when the search warrant 
is executed. 
 (2)  Determining whether probable cause can exist before 
the contraband has reached the locus of the search. To issue any 
warrant, the magistrate must be convinced beyond a “bare sus-
picion” that the evidence will be located on the premises at the 
time of the search.41 In making her decision, the magistrate 
must consider whether a person of reasonable caution would 
believe that the evidence is likely to be at the premises to be 
searched when the warrant is executed.42 For an anticipatory 
warrant, this means that the magistrate must have a credible 
reason for believing that although the evidence is not currently 
located on the premises, it will be there when the warrant is 
executed.43 
The courts have “adopt[ed] the ‘sure and irreversible course’ 
standard” for judging the validity of anticipatory warrant prob-
able cause determinations.44 When the contraband is on a sure 
and irreversible course to the premises to be searched, it is 
likely that the evidence of a crime will be “at the described lo-
cus at the time of the search.”45 As the First Circuit explained, 
[T]he sure course standard functions as a proxy for the actual 
presence of the contraband at the locus to be searched. It of-
fers the magistrate a trustworthy assurance that the contra-
band, though not yet on the site, will almost certainly be lo-
cated there at the time of the search, thus fulfilling the 
 
 40. Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702 (citing Lowe, 575 F.2d at 1194 ). 
 41. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949). 
 42. See id. 
 43. See Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12. 
 44. Id. at 13; see also United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1427-28 (7th Cir. 
1996); United States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969, 974 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 903 n.6 (11th Cir. 1990); Garcia, 882 F.2d at 702-03; United 
States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33, 36 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 
1465, 1468 (9th Cir. 1986). 
 45. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 10 (emphasis omitted). 
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requirement of future probable cause.46 
Generally, the “sure and irreversible course” standard is 
met when law enforcement has current possession of the con-
traband and is in control of its delivery. For example, when the 
government has conducted a child pornography sting operation 
and is actually the entity filling orders,47 the chance that the 
evidence will not be delivered to the premises is minimal, since 
law enforcement officers realize that the contraband must be 
delivered before the search can begin. The standard is also met 
when drugs, intercepted by postal inspectors, are then deliv-
ered to the defendant under controlled circumstances.48 Since 
evidence does not have to be at the location when the warrant 
is issued, and because there can be probable cause to justify is-
suing an anticipatory warrant, anticipatory warrants are not 
per se unconstitutional.49 The question becomes whether any 
additional constitutional or non-constitutional requirements 
should be imposed on the issuance of anticipatory warrants. 
c.  Conditions precedent: an additional requirement for the 
issuance of anticipatory warrants.50 Since there is a greater 
 
 46. Id. at 13. 
 47. See, e.g., United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194 (10th Cir. 1998); United 
States v. Ruddell, 71 F.3d 331 (9th Cir. 1995); Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 8; United States 
v. Koelling, 992 F.2d 817 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Dornhofer, 859 F.2d 1195 
(4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1988). 
 48. See, e.g., United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996) (intercepting 
marijuana being shipped from Texas to Illinois); United States v. Becerra, 97 F.3d 669 
(2d Cir. 1996) (intercepting cocaine shipped from Columbia to New York); United 
States v. Moetamedi, 46 F.3d 225 (2d Cir. 1995) (intercepting drugs being express 
mailed from Pakistan to New York); United States v. Lawson, 999 F.2d 985 (6th Cir. 
1993) (intercepting drugs being express mailed); United States v. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 
946 (8th Cir. 1993) (intercepting marijuana sent from Jamaica to Kansas City); United 
States v. Wylie, 919 F.2d 969 (5th Cir. 1990) (intercepting cocaine shipped via the 
United Parcel Service from Texas to Minnesota); United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699 
(2d Cir. 1989) (intercepting cocaine shipped from Panama); United States v. Lowe, 575 
F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1978) (intercepting heroin being sent from Thailand to Detroit). 
 49. See Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 11 (finding “it unsurprising that every circuit to 
have addressed the question has held that anticipatory search warrants are not cate-
gorically unconstitutional”) (citing as examples Tagbering, 985 F.2d at 950; United 
States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 903 n.6 (11th Cir. 1990); Wylie, 919 F.2d at 974-75; 
Goodwin, 854 F.2d at 36; United States v. Goff, 681 F.2d 1238, 1240 (9th Cir. 1982); 
Lowe, 575 F.2d at 1194; United States ex rel. Beal v. Skaff, 418 F.2d 430, 432-33 (7th 
Cir. 1969); see also Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703. 
 50. It should be noted that anticipatory warrants can be prohibited or limited by 
the terms of a state constitution or a statute. See, e.g., United States v. Hugoboom, 112 
F.3d 1081, 1085 n.5 (10th Cir. 1997) (due to the circumstances of the case, the court did 
not decide whether anticipatory warrants violated Article I, Section 4, of the Wyoming 
Constitution); Kostelec v. State, 703 A.2d 160 (Md. 1997) (holding that MD. CODE ANN. 
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chance of abuse with an anticipatory warrant than a tradi-
tional warrant,51 courts have required that the triggering 
events, or conditions precedent, be “explicit, clear, and nar-
rowly drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation 
by government agents.”52 Although the “conditions prece-
dent . . . are integral to [an anticipatory warrant’s] validity,”53 
courts are split as to how this requirement should be treated.  
 (1)  The probable cause approach to conditions precedent. 
The majority of the circuits view the conditions precedent as 
“mere guarantees that the probable cause determination at the 
time of issuance has reached fruition when the warrant is exe-
cuted.”54 By the term “mere,” these courts mean that the condi-
tions precedent are needed only for the magistrate to deter-
mine in the first instance that probable cause to search will 
exist when the warrant is executed, and in the second instance 
that probable cause did exist when the warrant was executed. 
Since the conditions precedent are merely determinations of 
probable cause, they do not have to be included in the warrant 
as the place, person, and items must be.55 Under this approach, 
as long as the magistrate concludes that the fulfillment of the 
conditions precedent ensures the existence of probable cause at 
the time of a warrant’s execution and the conditions are fol-
lowed by the executing officers, the anticipatory warrant is 
valid.56 The reasoning behind this approach has never been 
 
art. 27, § 551 (1997) does not allow for the issuance of anticipatory warrants). When 
the prohibition is due to statute only, legislatures may quickly change the permissibil-
ity of issuing anticipatory search warrants. Compare State v. Scott, 951 P.2d 1243, 
1247 (Haw. 1998) (holding “that the plain and unambiguous language of [HAW. REV. 
STAT.] § 803-31 does not permit the issuance of an [anticipatory search warrant]”), with 
State v. Opupele, 967 P.2d 265 (Haw. 1998) (noting that HAW. REV. STAT. § 803-31 
(1998) had been amended since the Scott decision earlier in the year, and now allowed 
the issuance of anticipatory search warrants). The purpose of this note, however, is to 
address the place of the anticipatory warrant in the framework of the Constitution. 
 51. See Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12. 
 52. Id. at 12 (citing Garcia, 882 F.2d at 703-04). 
 53. United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1997). 
 54. United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998); see Dennis, 
115 F.3d at 529; Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1086-87; United States v. Moetamedi, 46 F.3d 
225, 229 (2d Cir. 1995); Tagbering, 985 F.2d at 950; United States v. Rey, 923 F.2d 
1217, 1221 (6th Cir. 1991). 
 55. See United States v. Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that 
“although some of the circuits have suggested that it would be more ‘efficient’ or pref-
erable for an anticipatory warrant to state on its face the conditions necessary for its 
execution, none has found the failure to do so to constitute a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion”) (citations omitted). 
 56. See Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1087; Rey, 923 F.2d at 1221. 
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completely explained,57 but it does have the appearance of a “no 
harm, no foul” approach to the Fourth Amendment. Courts 
have upheld anticipatory warrants in situations where the af-
fidavit contained the conditions precedent and it was shown af-
ter the search that the conditions precedent had occurred prior 
to the warrant’s execution,58 and where the magistrate orally 
informed the police of the conditions precedent and it was dem-
onstrated that they had been met.59 
 (2)  The particularity approach to conditions precedent. 
The other approach to conditions precedent is to require that 
the conditions appear on the face of the warrant, and not just 
in the affidavit.60 This approach essentially writes a new par-
ticularity requirement into the Fourth Amendment. In addition 
to requiring the warrant to particularly describe the place to be 
searched and items to be seized, the warrant must also particu-
larly describe the conditions precedent for execution. If the 
warrant does not contain the conditions precedent for execu-
tion, the warrant is void.61 In United States v. Hotal, the Ninth 
Circuit decided between these two approaches.62 
 
 57. The Sixth Circuit has never fully explained why it adopted the probable 
cause approach. See Rey, 923 F.2d at 1221. In Rey, the court found that conditions 
precedent do not have to appear on the face of the warrant when a “reasonable infer-
ence can be made that the warrant authorizes a search only after the controlled deliv-
ery has occurred.” Id. What the court failed to explain was how a “reasonable infer-
ence” related to the constitution. 
 58. See Moetamedi, 46 F.3d 225. 
 59. See United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 60. See United States v. Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that 
“when a warrant’s execution is dependent on the occurrence of one or more conditions, 
the warrant itself must state the conditions precedent to its execution”). 
 61. See id. at 1227. As with the other particularity requirements, however, this 
statement is subject to the cure by affidavit principle which allows courts to consider in 
certain circumstances the specificity provided by the affidavit. See supra note 10. Al-
though all the circuits agree that an insufficiently particular warrant can be cured by 
the terms in the affidavit under certain circumstances, the circuits vary in the stan-
dard they require for cure by affidavit. See EchoHawk & EchoHawk, supra note 10, at 
14-22. Some courts require that the affidavit be incorporated by, and accompany, the 
warrant to the locus of the search if it is to cure the warrant’s description. See United 
States v. McGrew, 122 F.3d 847, 849-50 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Morris, 977 
F.2d 677, 681 n.3 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 60, 64 (3d Cir. 
1982). Other circuits merely require that the circumstances surrounding the execution 
of the warrant demonstrate the functional equivalence of having the affidavit incorpo-
rated by, and accompanying, the warrant for cure by affidavit to occur. See United 
States v. Jones, 54 F.3d 1285, 1291 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 
1112, 1116-17 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1351 n.6 
(11th Cir. 1982). 
 62. 143 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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III.  UNITED STATES V. HOTAL 
A.  Facts 
As part of a government sting operation, mailings were sent 
to certain individuals, offering them the chance to purchase 
child pornography. In response to this mailing, the government 
received a request for two videotapes from John David Hotal.63 
To complete the sting, postal inspectors planned a controlled 
delivery of the videotapes and, on January 23, 1996, sought an 
anticipatory search warrant of Mr. Hotal’s residence.64 
In the application affidavit for the anticipatory search war-
rant, United States Postal Inspector Rhonda Bowie stated that 
the package containing the two videotapes would be delivered 
the following day around one o’clock.65 “The affidavit further 
stated that the package [would] be kept under surveillance” 
until it was received by an individual at the residence and 
taken inside, at which time the warrant would be executed.66 
Although the application was for an anticipatory warrant, the 
warrant actually issued by the magistrate directed that the 
premises be searched “forthwith.”67 The warrant contained no 
statement that it was an anticipatory warrant, nor any descrip-
tion of the conditions precedent for its execution.68 
On January 24, 1996, the videotapes were delivered to Ho-
tal, who signed for them and took them inside his residence. A 
few minutes later, Bowie and several other officers executed 
the warrant. Although the warrant stated that “Bowie’s affida-
vit was attached and incorporated by reference,” the record 
contained no evidence that the affidavit accompanied the war-
rant to the scene of the search.69 
Hotal filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized in the 
search. One of the grounds for the motion was “that the war-
rant failed to specify that it was not to be executed until after 
the delivery of the videotapes.”70 The trial court denied Hotal’s 
 
 63. See id. at 1224. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. 
 66. Id. at 1224-25. 
 67. Id. at 1225. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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motion to suppress, and he subsequently was found guilty of 
receiving and possessing child pornography. On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the motion 
to suppress. 
B.  The Court’s Reasoning 
The Ninth Circuit addressed two issues: (1) whether the 
application affidavit could cure the warrant, and (2) whether 
the warrant was constitutionally sufficient. 
Concerning the first issue, the court rejected the govern-
ment’s contention that the problems with the warrant could be 
cured by the affidavit. Although the warrant incorporated the 
affidavit and stated that the affidavit was attached, as required 
for an affidavit to cure a warrant in the Ninth Circuit, no evi-
dence in the record showed that the “affidavit had accompanied 
the warrant at the time of search.”71 The court’s previous deci-
sions show that the government must prove that circumstances 
for cure by affidavit were present.72 Since the government had 
not met its burden of proof, the court would not allow the affi-
davit to be considered in determining the sufficiency of the 
warrant. 
The court next addressed the issue of the constitutionality 
of the warrant itself. The issue of “whether an anticipatory 
search warrant lacks sufficient particularity when it does not 
identify the event on which the execution of the warrant is 
conditioned and when instead it erroneously authorizes the 
search ‘forthwith’ ”73 was one of first impression in the Ninth 
Circuit. The court, however, was not without guidance. Noting 
a split among the circuits as to the appropriate standard of 
constitutionality,74 the Ninth Circuit was influenced by the 
 
 71. Id. at 1225. 
 72. See id. at 1225-26 (citing United States v. McGrew, 122 F.3d 847, 849-50 (9th 
Cir. 1997); United States v. Van Damme, 48 F.3d 461, 465-66 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
 73. Id. at 1226. 
 74. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text. Categorizing the circuits is not 
a simple matter because the issue of conditions precedent can become entangled with 
the issue of cure by affidavit. In the case cited by the Ninth Circuit for the proposition 
that the Second Circuit does not require the conditions precedent to appear in the war-
rant, it is unclear whether the Second Circuit made the determination based on a view 
of conditions precedent or cure by affidavit. Compare Hotal, 143 F.3d at 1226, with 
United States v. Moetamedi, 46 F.3d 225, 228-29 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing as authority 
Eighth Circuit cases dealing with both anticipatory warrants and cure by affidavit in 
general). The cases cited by the Ninth Circuit for the proposition that the Seventh and 
Eighth Circuits do not require conditions precedent to appear on the warrant were 
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First Circuit rule that “when a warrant’s execution is depend-
ent on the occurrence of one or more conditions, the warrant it-
self must state the conditions precedent to its execution and 
these conditions must be clear, explicit, and narrow.”75 
In explaining its holding that a warrant’s conditions prece-
dent must appear on its face, the Ninth Circuit relied upon the 
purposes behind the Fourth Amendment’s particularity re-
quirement:76 namely, to limit the discretion of the executing of-
ficers and to inform the person subject to the search of its justi-
fiable scope.77 The court also held that a violation of a condition 
precedent is as great an intrusion upon personal rights as an 
improper description of the place to be searched. 78 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
An anticipatory warrant’s conditions precedent are essen-
tial to its validity.79 However, courts differ on whether the con-
 
clearly decided based upon cure by affidavit principles and not on an independent 
analysis of conditions precedent. Compare Hotal, 143 F.3d at 1226, with United States 
v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 528-29 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the failure of the warrant 
to list the conditions precedent was cured by the affidavit); United States v. Tagbering, 
985 F.2d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 1993) (holding that the affidavit was incorporated by the 
warrant so it could be considered as part of the warrant). However, it is clear that the 
Seventh Circuit does not require conditions precedent to appear on the face of the war-
rant independent of cure by affidavit considerations. See United States v. Leidner, 99 
F.3d 1423, 1427 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the court was “not compelled by the Con-
stitution to require [the conditions precedent to appear in the warrant] since all that is 
constitutionally required is that the search warrant be supported by probable cause”). 
Unlike some circuits, the Tenth Circuit is easy to categorize. In dealing with cure by 
affidavit, the Tenth Circuit has held that “the affidavit and search warrant must be 
physically connected so that they constitute one document . . . and . . . the search war-
rant must expressly refer to the affidavit and incorporate it by reference using suitable 
words of reference.” United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 603 (10th Cir. 1988) (citations 
omitted). In dealing with the question of conditions precedent, the Tenth Circuit im-
posed no such restrictions, relying solely upon the appearance of the conditions prece-
dent in the affidavit. See United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081, 1087 (10th Cir. 
1997). 
 75. Hotal, 143 F.3d at 1226; but see United States v. Vigneau, 1999 WL 508810, 
at n.8 (1st Cir. (R.I.)) (stating that the Ninth Circuit had misinterpreted its holding in 
United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
 76. See id. at 1227. 
 77. See id. (citing McGrew, 122 F.3d at 850). 
 78. Id. (noting the equal constitution requirement that “all parties be advised 
when the search may first take place, and the conditions upon the occurrence of which 
the search is authorized and may lawfully be instituted”). 
 79. See United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that 
the “conditions precedent . . . are integral to [an anticipatory warrant’s] validity”); see 
also Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1085 (holding that anticipatory warrants are not per se 
unconstitutional “so long as the conditions precedent to execution are clearly set forth 
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ditions precedent are to be treated solely as a matter of prob-
able cause, or whether the conditions precedent should be 
treated as a time-based particularity requirement.80 This Part 
analyzes the two approaches courts have taken to conditions 
precedent. First, the strengths and weaknesses of each ap-
proach are analyzed. Next, this Part considers the two ap-
proaches in light of the balancing tests used by the courts in 
determining the proper balance between the competing inter-
ests behind the Fourth Amendment: namely, society’s interest 
in effective law enforcement and the competing interest of indi-
viduals in protecting the privacy of their homes from unrea-
sonable searches. Finally, this Part provides answers to three 
questions that arise once the particularity approach is adopted: 
1) How much discretion should be allowed the executing of-
ficers; 
2) How does the cure-by-affidavit principle effect the par-
ticularity approach; and 
3) What impact, if any, should anticipatory warrants have 
on the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant re-
quirement? 
A.  Comparing Approaches to Conditions Precedent 
As the Ninth Circuit recognized, there are two approaches 
to an anticipatory warrant’s conditions precedent. One ap-
proach requires that the conditions precedent be on the face of 
the warrant, creating an additional particularity requirement. 
The other approach treats conditions precedent as necessary 
only for the magistrate’s probable cause determination.81 Both 
approaches have strengths and weaknesses which tend to mir-
ror each other; the failing of one approach is the strength of the 
other. The Ninth Circuit, however, addressed only one weak-
ness of the probable cause approach and the reciprocal strength 
of the particularity approach, disregarding other important 
considerations. This section will consider additional strengths 
and weaknesses of the two approaches to determine which one 
 
in the warrant or in the affidavit in support of the anticipatory warrant”); United 
States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that “the magistrate must 
set conditions governing an anticipatory warrant that are ‘explicit, clear, and narrowly 
drawn so as to avoid misunderstanding or manipulation by government agents’ ” (quot-
ing United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 703-04 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
 80. See Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223. 
 81. See id. at 1226. 
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more effectively protects Fourth Amendment interests. 
1.  Literal reading versus overall intent 
The strongest argument in favor of the probable cause ap-
proach is that it conforms to the literal text of the Fourth 
Amendment. As the Tenth Circuit noted, “the United States 
Constitution only requires that a search . . . not be unreason-
able, and that warrants . . . be supported by probable cause.”82 
While the text of the amendment also requires a particular de-
scription of the place, persons, and items to be searched or 
seized, it does not include a similar requirement for the time of 
execution.83 There is no requirement that the exact grounds for 
probable cause must be recited in the warrant.84 Therefore, 
once conditions precedent are considered as a matter only of 
probable cause, a court clearly is justified in holding that they 
do not have to be recited in the warrant. They need only appear 
in the affidavit, because it is the affidavit upon which the mag-
istrate bases his or her determination of probable cause.85 Un-
der this approach, time-based conditions precedent are rele-
vant only in a postexecution review to assure that probable 
cause did exist when the warrant was executed.86 While the 
 
 82. United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting 
United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 965 (1st Cir. 1994) (quoting U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV)) (alteration in original). 
 83. See U.S. CONST. amend IV. 
 84. See Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1087. 
Certainly, the most efficient way to ensure that an anticipatory warrant is 
properly executed is to include the conditions for its execution in the warrant. 
We will not posit a Fourth Amendment violation requiring suppression, how-
ever, when constitutionally satisfactory conditions for execution of the war-
rant are stated in the affidavit that solicits the warrant, accepted by the issu-
ing magistrate, and actually satisfied in the execution of the warrant. 
Id. 
 85. See Hugoboom, 112 F.3d at 1087 (holding warrant not constitutionally defec-
tive for failing to list the conditions precedent for execution where the conditions 
precedent were included in the application affidavit); United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 
1423, 1427 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the court was “not compelled by the Constitu-
tion to require [the conditions precedent to appear in the warrant] since all that is con-
stitutionally required is that the search warrant be supported by probable cause”); 
United States v. Rey, 923 F.2d 1217, 1221 (6th. Cir. 1991) (holding that although it is 
preferable to include the conditions precedent in the warrant, non-inclusion does not 
void the warrant if it can be inferred from the affidavit that the warrant is only to be 
executed after the triggering events do occur). 
 86. See, e.g., United States v. Koelling, 992 F.2d 817, 823 (8th Cir. 1993) (review-
ing validity of warrant and noting that from the facts of the case, “it is clear that the 
execution of the warrant occurred after the controlled delivery had taken place”). 
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particularity approach is not a literal reading of the amend-
ment, it arguably is more consistent with the amendment’s in-
tent. 
The probable cause approach looks at the text of the 
amendment as distinct units: there is a probable cause re-
quirement and a particularity requirement. The particularity 
approach, on the other hand, extends the probable cause re-
quirement by considering the amendment in its entirety. The 
particularity requirement’s purpose is to ensure that the 
search does not extend into those areas and for those things for 
which probable cause to search does not exist. Although the 
magistrate does not have to express in the warrant every rea-
son for finding probable cause, the particularity requirement 
does require that the magistrate express the extent of intrusion 
justified by probable cause. The Fourth Amendment, as a 
whole, requires a magistrate to express in the warrant exactly 
what the probable cause has justified. Conditions precedent, 
even though a matter of probable cause, also relate to when the 
magistrate has authorized a search. In keeping with the theme 
of the Fourth Amendment, timing should be included in the 
warrant. 
Requiring the warrant to contain a description of when 
probable cause has justified a search is not as large of an inno-
vation as it might seem. The time for execution usually is part 
of even traditional warrants. In a traditional warrant, the mag-
istrate includes a description of the time for the warrant to be 
served as “forthwith.” If the police wait too long before execut-
ing the warrant, the probable cause upon which it is based be-
comes stale and the warrant is no longer valid.87 To deal with 
the staleness issue, jurisdictions have adopted bright line rules 
requiring execution of the warrant within a specified number of 
days.88 The time requirement in anticipatory warrants is just 
 
 87. See United States v. Gibson, 123 F.3d 1121, 1124 (8th Cir. 1997) (“A delay in 
executing a search warrant may render stale the probable cause finding.”). 
 88. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(c)(1) (requiring that the warrant “command the offi-
cer to search, within a specified period of time not to exceed 10 days, the person or 
place named for the property or person specified”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1534 (West 
1998) (ten days); FLA. STAT. ch. 933.05 (1998) (ten days); IDAHO CODE § 19-4412 (1998) 
(ten days); N.Y. CRIM. P. LAW § 690.30 (McKinney 1998) (ten days); TEX. CODE CRIM. 
P. ANN. art. 18.06 (West 1998) (three days); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-23-205(2) (1998) 
(“The search warrant shall be served within ten days from the date of issuance. Any 
search warrant not executed within this time shall be void and shall be returned to the 
court or magistrate as not executed.”); see generally RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE 
SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 166-89, Chart 
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as important, not because probable cause will cease to exist, 
but because probable cause presently does not exist. Before the 
triggering event occurs, probable cause to search does not exist. 
This is the exact issue that was presented to the Hotal court. 
In Hotal, the magistrate issued a warrant which authorized 
and directed law enforcement officers to search the premises 
forthwith without any qualifying language to inform the police 
that the warrant could not be served until the contraband had 
been delivered. When the warrant was issued, probable cause 
to search Hotal’s premises did not exist; the probable cause re-
quirement was satisfied only upon the contraband’s delivery. 
The warrant that issued was, therefore, beyond the scope justi-
fied by probable cause because there was no justification for 
searching “forthwith.”89 A warrant that authorizes more than 
probable cause would justify is clearly void. 
2.  The exclusion solution 
The second argument for accepting the probable cause ap-
proach is that an overly technical requirement is not needed to 
protect Fourth Amendment rights.90 When a court determines 
that the evidence is on a sure course to a location, it is usually 
because law enforcement is in possession of the contraband, 
controlling its delivery.91 To invalidate the warrant and, there-
fore, invalidate the search as the Ninth Circuit did in Hotal, 
seems like a ridiculous result when the police see the package 
 
III (1985). 
 89. However, a warrant that authorizes a search forthwith that also contains 
conditions precedent is not necessarily void. See United States v. Ruddell, 71 F.3d 331 
(9th Cir. 1995). The term “forthwith” generally means that the warrant must be exe-
cuted before the statutory time for execution has elapsed. See id. at 333. As long as the 
conditions precedent and execution are accomplished before the statutorily proscribed 
time period, the warrant is still valid. See id. 
 90. In other areas of Fourth Amendment analysis the courts have warned 
against hypertechnical standards. See, e.g., United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 
109 (1965) (holding that “the courts should not invalidate the warrant by interpreting 
the affidavit in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner.”); United States 
v. Giacalone, 541 F.2d 508, 514 (6th Cir. 1976) (holding that “warrants are not to be 
read in a negative or hypertechnical manner”). 
 91. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1203 n.3 (10th Cir. 
1998); United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 530 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. 
Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423 (7th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Hendricks, 743 F.2d 
653, 655 (9th Cir. 1984) (invalidating an anticipatory warrant to search the defendant’s 
house because the evidence was not on a sure course to the site desired to be searched 
since the warrant merely required that the defendant take possession of the box con-
taining contraband at the post office). 
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accepted by the defendant and taken into his or her home. Can 
there be any doubt in such a situation that contraband will be 
found at the site of the search? In addition, a hypertechnical 
requirement is not needed because the exclusionary rule acts 
as a general deterrent to keep police from executing the war-
rant before the conditions precedent occur.92 Under the exclu-
sionary rule, if the warrant is executed before the conditions 
precedent occur, the evidence will be suppressed. Knowing this, 
the police will have no incentive to execute the warrant prema-
turely even if it does not contain the conditions precedent on its 
face. 
The reliance of probable-cause courts on the exclusionary 
rule, however, ignores the framers’ intent in drafting the 
Fourth Amendment. The framers provided for specific pre-
search protections. The framers could have merely required 
that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated,”93 but that was not enough. The 
framers provided for enumerated pre-search protections. Spe-
cifically, a warrant cannot issue unless it is based upon prob-
able cause and particularly describes those areas for which 
probable cause exists. Requiring the warrant to include the 
conditions precedent is consistent with the particularity provi-
sions of the warrant clause. It is for this reason that the Ninth 
Circuit rejected the probable cause approach. The Hotal court 
found that the probable cause approach “fail[ed] to meet any of 
the concerns set forth in [the Ninth Circuit’s] past cases.”94 
Those concerns include informing both the police and the sus-
pect of the search and its authorized scope.95 The probable 
cause approach does not concern itself with such ramifications. 
Instead, the approach focuses solely on the role of conditions 
precedent in the magistrate’s probable cause analysis and 
leaves protections to the exclusionary rule. 
In addition, the exclusionary rule would not apply in many 
circumstances where anticipatory warrants are executed pre-
maturely. Generally, when an anticipatory warrant is executed 
 
 92. See United States v. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 946, 950 (8th Cir. 1993) (“If the 
warrant is executed before the controlled delivery occurs, then suppression may well be 
warranted for that reason.”). 
 93. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 94. United States v. Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 95. See id. 
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early, it is void,96 and the evidence found as a result of the 
search may be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.97 The 
evidence, however, is not automatically excluded, as the exclu-
sionary rule is subject to good faith exceptions.98 If the “officers 
reasonably rel[y] on a warrant issued by a detached and neu-
tral magistrate . . . such evidence should be admissible in the 
prosecution’s case in chief.”99 Most notably, the police are al-
lowed to rely on a warrant’s validity as long as it is not “facially 
deficient.” Thus, in some cases, under probable cause analysis, 
the good faith exception could result in the admission of evi-
dence seized prematurely under an incomplete anticipatory 
warrant. 
The truth of this statement can be better understood in the 
form of the following scenario: Police officers in a probable 
cause jurisdiction become aware that drugs are being shipped 
through the mail to an individual’s home. The officers would 
like to search the home as soon as the drugs arrive and, there-
fore, seek an anticipatory warrant. In the application affidavit, 
the officers request a warrant which will be executed only after 
the contraband has been delivered to the house and taken in-
side. The magistrate, satisfied that probable cause will exist as 
long as the warrant is not executed until after the conditions in 
the affidavit have occurred, signs the warrant. However, the 
warrant itself does not include the conditions precedent (the 
warrant could even contain an authorization to search “forth-
with”). Acting on the warrant, police search the premises, but 
do so before the evidence has been delivered. Even though the 
drugs have not yet been delivered, the officers find other evi-
dence of criminal activity. Should the evidence be suppressed? 
The warrant is void because it was executed prematurely. 
Therefore, initially the answer is yes, the evidence should be 
suppressed. However, the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule must be applied. Here, there is no evidence that 
the magistrate did not act in a neutral and detached manner or 
that there was no justification for the magistrate’s probable 
cause determination. Therefore, the police are entitled to rely 
 
 96. See United States v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699, 702 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 97. See Tagbering, 985 F.2d at 950 (“If the warrant is executed before the con-
trolled delivery occurs, then suppression may well be warranted for that reason.”); see 
also FED. R. CRIM. P. (41)(f); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). 
 98. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984). 
 99. Id. at 913. 
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upon that determination. The police would also be able to rely 
on the warrant because it was not facially deficient. The war-
rant looked like any other which would authorize immediate 
search. Even if the issuing magistrate informed the applying 
officers that the warrant should not be executed until the affi-
davit’s conditions precedent were fulfilled, this admonition may 
not be passed on to the executing officers.100 Unless the defen-
dant could find subjective reasons to defeat the executing offi-
cers’ belief that the warrant was valid when executed, the evi-
dence would be admitted. 
Therefore, despite the acceptance by probable cause courts 
of the proposition that conditions precedent are integral to the 
validity of an anticipatory warrant, premature execution of 
warrants is not sufficiently protected against under the prob-
able cause approach. This situation occurs because these courts 
fail to concede what has been conceded in other areas of Fourth 
Amendment analysis—that the warrant and the affidavit con-
sidered by the magistrate are two separate documents which 
serve differing purposes. Until these courts concede this differ-
ence, their admonitions that “magistrates issuing such war-
rants must protect against opportunities for . . . unfettered dis-
cretion, in part by explicitly placing conditions on execution”101 
will make little sense. If the conditions precedent do not appear 
on the warrant, where has the magistrate explicitly placed 
conditions on execution?102 Do these courts assume that verbal 
instructions will be given by the magistrate to the applying of-
ficers? How is it to be guaranteed that this admonition will be 
passed on to the executing officers,103 especially when, for pur-
poses of the good faith exception, it may be best not to pass 
along the admonition?104 
The particularity approach answers these questions by re-
quiring the conditions precedent to appear on the warrant. The 
magistrate does not have to rely upon a verbal admonition be-
ing passed along because each executing officer can read the 
warrant and ascertain what events must occur before the war-
rant is valid. With less opportunity for abuse, an anticipatory 
 
 100. See United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1429 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 101. United States v. Rowland, 145 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Cir. 1998) (summariz-
ing part of the holding in United States v. Riciardelli, 998 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
 102. See id. 
 103. See Leidner, 99 F.3d at 1429. 
 104. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. 
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warrant in a particularity jurisdiction provides greater protec-
tion of Fourth Amendment rights. 
B.  The Particularity Approach and Balancing Tests 
The Fourth Amendment represents a marker between two 
competing interests. On one side is the interest in being secure 
from unjustified government intrusion into private areas. On 
the other side is society’s interest in effective law enforcement. 
As a marker, the Fourth Amendment can be moved toward one 
interest or the other depending on how the courts choose to in-
terpret the wording and intent of the Amendment. In deciding 
where the marker should be, courts consider the two interests 
and try to strike the appropriate balance. This section dis-
cusses the particularity approach to conditions precedent in 
terms of the Supreme Court’s “reasonableness” balancing test 
and the unwritten pragmatic balancing test. 
1.  The “reasonableness” balancing test 
The Supreme Court’s “reasonableness” balancing test in-
volves the balancing of “the intrusion on the individual’s 
Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legiti-
mate governmental interests.”105 “[T]here is ‘no ready test for 
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need 
to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search [or 
seizure] entails.’ ”106 Originally, the balancing test was only 
used to determine when a search was reasonable outside of the 
warrant requirements.107 However, the Supreme Court has 
been willing to expand the use of the balancing test beyond its 
original application.108 Therefore, even though the balancing 
 
 105. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 331 (1990). 
 106. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (citing Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 
U.S. 523, 534-37 (1967)) (alterations in the original). 
 107. See generally Buie, 494 U.S. 325; see, e.g., Michigan Dept. of State Police v. 
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (applying the balancing test to highway sobriety checkpoints); 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (applying the balancing test to a school offi-
cial’s warrantless search of a student’s purse); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (applying the balancing test to stop-and-frisk situa-
tions). 
 108. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Use of a such a 
‘balancing test’ to determine the standard for evaluating the validity of a full-scale 
search represents a sizable [sic] innovation in Fourth Amendment analysis.”); cf. Terry, 
392 U.S. 1. Even in T.L.O., however, the court was using the balancing test in 
considering the “ ‘reasonableness’ standard whose only definite content is that it is not 
the same test as the ‘probable cause’ standard found in the text of the Fourth 
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test previously has not been used on the particularity clause of 
the Fourth Amendment, such an analysis is not without justifi-
cation. The balancing test is especially applicable to conditions 
precedent since a requirement that they appear on the face of 
the warrant can only be implied from the text and purposes 
behind the Fourth Amendment. As an implied requirement it 
is, therefore, especially appropriate to determine whether it is 
reasonable. 
Since the courts have agreed that conditions precedent are 
vital to the validity of an anticipatory warrant under the prob-
able cause requirement109 (an area of the Fourth Amendment 
not covered by the balancing test because it is part of the war-
rant clause), this Note will not consider the general burden im-
posed on law enforcement or the benefits received by citizens 
by requiring conditions precedent. Instead, this section focuses 
on the marginal burdens and benefits of requiring an anticipa-
tory warrant to contain the conditions precedent on its face as 
an implied particularity term rather than deeming their inclu-
sion in the affidavit considered by the magistrate to be suffi-
cient.110 
At issue here are potential intrusions into the most private 
and important of all areas—the home—against a general gov-
ernmental interest in enforcing its laws. Prohibiting unreason-
able, extended governmental intrusions into the home is one of 
the most important interests protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment. This interest must be balanced against the government’s 
interest in effective law enforcement. On its own, a general 
governmental interest in enforcing laws has not been enough to 
tip the scales in favor of the probable cause approach to antici-
patory warrants. This general interest must be accompanied by 
a more specific and important interest.111 Allowing the condi-
 
test as the ‘probable cause’ standard found in the text of the Fourth Amendment.” 
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 354 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
 109. See, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 115 F.3d 524, 528 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding 
that the “conditions precedent . . . are integral to [an anticipatory warrants] validity”); 
United States v. Hugoboom, 112 F.3d 1081, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that antici-
patory warrants are not per se unconstitutional “so long as the conditions precedent to 
execution are clearly set forth in the warrant or in the affidavit in support of the an-
ticipatory warrant”). 
 110. Recognizing, of course, that if this were an express requirement of the war-
rant clause, the balancing test would not be applicable. 
 111. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 23-24 (approving stop-and-frisks because of a “con-
cern[] with more than the governmental interest in investigating crime” and recogniz-
ing the additional “need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other 
HAM-FIN.DOC 4/10/00  1:14 PM 
1030 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1999 
tions precedent to appear only in the affidavit considered by 
the magistrate for her probable cause determination would 
promote no specific interest beyond the government’s general 
interest in effective law enforcement. On the other hand, po-
tential intrusions into homes weighs as a substantial interest 
in favor of requiring conditions precedent to be included in the 
warrant. 
2.  The pragmatic balancing test 
The pragmatic balancing test arises from the recognition 
that courts sometimes use the law to “reach[] a predetermined 
conclusion.”112 Even though the “reasonableness” balancing test 
weighs the burden placed upon the individual against the in-
terests of law enforcement that are promoted, it would be naive 
not to admit that courts also consider the inverse—the burden 
a requirement would impose on law enforcement versus the 
benefit to the individual. Again, this section will consider only 
the marginal burden placed upon law enforcement by requiring 
the conditions precedent to appear on the face of the warrant 
versus the marginal benefit to Fourth Amendment interests 
gained by such a requirement. 
The burden on law enforcement could be significant if offi-
cers choose not to include conditions precedent on the face of 
the warrant. However, this is unlikely to become a major prob-
lem. Officers are interested in making sure that seized evi-
dence will not be suppressed. They also clearly understand that 
a warrant must contain a particular description of the places to 
be searched and items to be seized. It is well within the ability 
of law enforcement to understand that conditions precedent 
must be included on the face of an anticipatory warrant or the 
evidence will be suppressed. After all, it makes sense that if the 
evidence upon which probable cause to issue the warrant is 
based has not yet reached the intended location of the search, 
the warrant should not state that police have the authority to 
search the premises “forthwith.” This minimal burden on law 
 
prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause to ar-
rest”); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339 (upholding the search of student’s purse by a school prin-
cipal because of “the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining 
discipline in the classroom and on school grounds”); but see Michigan Dept. of State Po-
lice v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding sobriety checkpoints based upon the state 
interest in eradicating drunk driving). 
 112. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 367 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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enforcement is balanced against the need to protect citizens 
against the premature execution of an anticipatory search war-
rant.113 Once again, the balancing test clearly favors requiring 
the conditions precedent to appear on the face of the warrant. 
C.  Unanswered Questions of the Particularity Approach 
Even courts which hold that conditions precedent must ap-
pear on the face of the warrant must determine what standard 
should be used to review conditions precedent, whether law en-
forcement should be given greater discretion in the area of an-
ticipatory warrants, and whether a failure in the warrant can 
be cured by the affidavit. 
1.  Discretion of the executing officers 
In the area of anticipatory warrants, courts have required 
that the conditions precedent be “explicit, clear, and narrowly 
drawn.”114 But under traditional particularity analysis, the de-
scription in the warrant has to be such that it leaves no discre-
tion to the executing officer as to what places to search and 
what items to seize.115 Carrying over this analysis would neces-
sitate that the terms “explicit, clear, and narrowly drawn” be 
interpreted to mean that no discretion be left to the executing 
officers as to when the search is to be conducted. The warrant 
would have to outline the conditions precedent with enough 
particularity so as to leave no question as to when the execut-
ing officers are to perform the search. However, the word 
“when” must be used in its proper sense. It should not be inter-
preted as requiring the magistrate to include a date and time 
when the warrant must be executed. Even traditional warrants 
usually can be executed up to ten days after being issued.116 
Rather than defining “when” as a date and time, courts should 
look at the term “when” as a point within a continuum of 
events. The warrant must, with enough particularity to elimi-
nate police discretion, describe at what point within a chain of 
events the police can execute the search warrant. 
 
 113. See, e.g., United States v. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d 8 (1st Cir. 1993); United 
States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding search based on erroneous con-
clusion that the warrant at issue was not anticipatory). 
 114. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 13. 
 115. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 (1976). 
 116. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
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Besides addressing how particular a warrant must be in de-
lineating the time of execution, courts must also address the 
appropriate level of particularity with which the place and 
items to be searched or seized must be described. As previously 
discussed, at least one court has allowed the particularity 
standard to be lower when dealing with an anticipatory war-
rant instead of with a traditional warrant.117 Although the 
court did not address this issue specifically, there is some justi-
fication for this position. First, anticipatory warrants are used 
in an area where law enforcement has previously relied upon 
exigent circumstances to search. If the police could search un-
der the exigent circumstances exception but instead choose to 
obtain a warrant, the courts should be willing to allow less par-
ticularity in the warrant. Requiring the same type of particu-
larity that must be present in a traditional warrant may lead 
law enforcement to return to relying on exigent circumstances 
rather than obtaining a warrant, and citizens would therefore 
be less protected than they would be if police were getting less 
specific warrants issued from neutral magistrates. Second, the 
Fourth Amendment could be read as a single requirement for a 
reasonable search. The court could determine that reasonable-
ness requires a less particular warrant when dealing with an-
ticipatory warrants. However, these are not sufficient justifica-
tions for accepting these positions. 
First, it should be noted that “a warrant conditioned on a 
future event presents a potential for abuse above and beyond 
that which exists in more traditional settings . . . .”118 There-
fore, the interest in limiting the chances of abuse should be 
more rather than less in the area of anticipatory warrants. 
Second, the exigent circumstances exception may no longer be 
viable in certain circumstances where an anticipatory warrant 
can be obtained,119 so the idea that police should be given more 
leeway because they could search anyway does not exist. Third, 
the reading of the amendment as one large reasonableness re-
quirement does not fit with past interpretation. The standard 
for determination of what constitutes a particular description 
has been treated separately from the reasonableness require-
ment in the past. All searches must be reasonable and all war-
 
 117. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text. 
 118. Ricciardelli, 998 F.2d at 12. 
 119. See infra notes 123-26 and accompanying text. 
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rants must contain a particular description. Lowering the 
standard of what constitutes a particular description in an area 
where there is greater opportunity for abuse would undermine 
the entire warrant requirement. 
Once the standard of particularity is set, courts must then 
set a standard for review in determining whether the warrant 
contains enough particularity. The review of the particularity 
of conditions precedent should be in conformity with other ar-
eas of particularity analysis. The description should, therefore, 
“be one of reasonable specificity,” and be read “not ‘hypertech-
nical[ly]’, but in a ‘commonsense’ fashion.”120 There is “no justi-
fication for a stricter standard in respect to specificity of time 
than in respect to the other two (constitutionally referenced) 
search parameters.”121 
2.  Cure by affidavit 
Another issue that is relevant to particularity considera-
tions is the doctrine of cure by affidavit. Generally, the affida-
vit cannot be considered in assessing the particularity of the 
warrant because of the distinction between the two documents. 
However, all of the circuit courts will allow the specificity in 
the affidavit to cure the warrant in limited situations. Al-
though this issue has not yet been specifically addressed by the 
Supreme Court, the Court has implied that it too will approve 
the practice.122 
There is no reason why cure by affidavit should not be ap-
plicable to a description of the time of execution to the same ex-
tent it is applicable to descriptions of the place and items for 
which to search. If there is “no justification for a stricter stan-
dard in respect to specificity of time,”123 there is clearly no justi-
fication for a more stringent standard for cure by affidavit. 
Therefore, the description in the warrant should be curable by 
a specific description in the warrant if the standards of cure by 
affidavit are met.124 What must be avoided, however, is a lower 
 
 120. United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 966 (1st Cir. 1994) (alteration in 
origional) (citations omitted). 
 121. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 122. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 990 n.7 (1984) (implying that 
the affidavit could have cured the warrant if the judge had crossed out the description 
in the warrant and attached the affidavit). 
 123. Gendron, 18 F.3d at 966. 
 124. Until the Supreme Court rules on the issue of cure by affidavit, there will 
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standard of cure by affidavit. A lower standard of cure by affi-
davit would undermine the requirement that the time of execu-
tion be included in the warrant. It would allow the probable 
cause approach, which requires only that the conditions prece-
dent be in the affidavit, to undermine the particularity ap-
proach. 
3.  The effect of anticipatory warrants on exigent circumstances 
Under limited circumstances, the courts have upheld cer-
tain types of searches performed without a warrant. These ex-
ceptions have been permitted only “when ‘special needs, beyond 
the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and 
probable-cause requirement impracticable.’ ”125 One such excep-
tion is the exigent circumstances exception. Under this excep-
tion, police can search without a warrant if there is “ ‘a great 
likelihood that the evidence will be destroyed or removed before 
a warrant can be obtained.’ ”126 The evidence must be subject to 
 
continue to be confusion among the circuit courts over what the proper standard for 
cure by affidavit should be. Currently, there is a five way split among the circuits as to 
what the proper standard should be. The Tenth Circuit is the only circuit that requires 
the affidavit to be expressly incorporated by the warrant and be attached to the war-
rant. See United States v. Dahlman, 13 F.3d 1391 (10th Cir. 1993). The First, Third, 
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits require that the warrant incorporate the affidavit and that 
the affidavit accompany the warrant. See United States v. Towne, 997 F.2d 537 (9th 
Cir. 1993); United States v. Morris, 977 F.2d 677, 681 n.3 (1st Cir. 1992); United States 
v. Johnson, 690 F.2d 60 (3d Cir. 1982); United States v. Johnson, 541 F.2d 1311 (8th 
Cir. 1976). The Fourth and Fifth Circuits will cure an insufficient warrant if the affi-
davit is either incorporated by the warrant or accompanies the warrant. See United 
States v. Beaumont, 972 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Washington, 852 
F.2d 803, 805 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Haydel, 649 F.2d 1152 (5th Cir. 1981), 
corrected by 664 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1981). The D.C. Circuit requires that the warrant 
expressly incorporate the affidavit and requires that the circumstances show that the 
equivalence of having the affidavit accompany the warrant occurred. See United States 
v. Dale, 991 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (per curiam). The Second, Seventh, and Eleventh 
Circuits require only the functional equivalence of incorporation and accompany. See 
United States v. Jones, 54 F.3d 1285 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Bianco, 998 F.2d 
1112 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1982). The 
Sixth Circuit uses two different standards depending on whether the warrant errone-
ously describes the place to be searched or whether the description is absent. See 
United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 1162 (6th Cir. 1995) (Batchelder, J., dissenting); 
United States v. Blakeney, 942 F.2d 1001 (6th cir. 1991); United States v. Gahagan, 
865 F.2d 1490 (6th Cir. 1989). For an in depth discussion of the topic of cure by affida-
vit, see generally EchoHawk & EchoHawk, supra note 10. 
 125. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment)). 
 126. 3 LAFAVE, supra note 5, § 6.5(b), at 342 (quoting State v. Patterson, 220 
N.W.2d 235 (Neb. 1974)). 
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destruction or removal “before a warrant can be obtained.”127 
With the acceptance of anticipatory warrants, a search warrant 
can now be obtained before the evidence has even reached the 
locus of the search. Some courts have seemed to imply that 
even though the police can now obtain a warrant in advance of 
the delivery of the contraband, they retain the option of search-
ing under the exigent circumstances exception.128 However, the 
continued acceptance of exigent circumstances searches in 
these situations would be contrary to the preferred practice of 
obtaining a warrant. In anticipatory warrant situations where 
law enforcement is in control of the delivery of the contraband, 
the evidence is not subject to destruction or removal until the 
police place it in that situation. To allow the police to create the 
exigent circumstance when they could have delayed delivery 
long enough to obtain a warrant defeats the warrant require-
ment. In some circumstances, even though police do have pos-
session of the contraband or are controlling its delivery, there 
will not be enough time to obtain a warrant. For example, if the 
police intercept a drug courier minutes before he reaches the 
intended location of his delivery, the police may still deliver the 
illegal narcotics and search the premises without an anticipa-
tory warrant under the exigent circumstances exception. On 
the other hand, where contraband is located in the mails and 
police have several days to obtain a warrant, an exigent cir-
cumstance would not exist. Courts will have to determine on a 
case-by-case basis when an opportunity to obtain an anticipa-
tory warrant negates the existence of an exigent circumstance. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit correctly decided that a warrant’s facial 
identification of conditions precedent is “not merely ‘efficient’ or 
preferable; it is indeed the only way effectively to safeguard 
 
 127. Id. (emphasis added). 
 128. See United States v. Brown, 49 F.3d 1346, 1348 n.2 (8th Cir. 1995) (“Al-
though several hours passed between the time of the phone call and the time of the de-
livery, the police obtained neither a search nor an arrest warrant. We note that a more 
prudent procedure would have been to obtain a conditional ‘anticipatory’ search war-
rant.”); United States v. Nixon, 918 F.2d 895, 903 n.6 (11th Cir. 1990) (“We know of no 
precedent, . . . that requires law enforcement officials to try to obtain an anticipatory 
warrant if they may possibly be able to justify one.”); United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 
1267, 1270-71 n.3 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Appellants have directed us to no federal case pur-
porting to require that the government obtain an anticipatory search warrant.”). 
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against unreasonable and unbounded searches.”129 By requiring 
conditions precedent to appear on the face of a warrant, the 
particularity approach ensures that both the police and the 
subject of the search will be informed of the time at which the 
warrant properly may be executed. In the situation described 
in the Introduction, I was worried about the police coming to 
search my apartment even though I had nothing to hide but 
the two pounds of marijuana someone had decided to ship us-
ing my post office box as the return address. At least I knew 
that the police might possibly be coming and the reason for 
their visit. If, on the other hand, they had arrived at my 
apartment with a warrant authorizing a search “forthwith,” 
and I had not yet picked up my mail, I can only imagine the 
feeling of shock I would have then felt and the resentment I 
would still be feeling to this day. The Fourth Amendment is 
meant to offer real protection to all citizens against unreason-
able searches and seizures. The probable cause approach to 
conditions precedent for anticipatory warrants does not provide 
enough protection of Fourth Amendment interests. The par-
ticularity approach, on the other hand, does. 
Instead of focusing on each individual clause in the Fourth 
Amendment, the particularity approach considers the intent of 
the amendment as a whole, recognizing the relationship be-
tween the particular description and probable cause phrases. 
By extending the requirement that the warrant must contain a 
description of the authorized intrusion also to include a time 
element, the particularity approach continues to provide the 
protection the framers intended. 
The particularity approach further conforms to the framers’ 
intent by requiring judicial review prior to execution of any 
warrant rather than relying on the ex post facto exclusionary 
rule. Waiting until after the warrant has been executed to de-
termine when the warrant was authorized to be served, as 
would occur under the probable cause approach, allows too 
many opportunities for Fourth Amendment rights to be sub-
verted. Exclusion is not the solution; the framers intended that 
unreasonable police intrusions would be stopped before they 
occur. 
Finally, the particularity approach protects these interests 
with minimal additional burdens on law enforcement. Under 
 
 129. United States v. Hotal, 143 F.3d 1223, 1227 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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the status quo, it has been clearly established that conditions 
precedent are vital to the validity of anticipatory warrants. The 
particularity approach merely requires that these vital condi-
tions be included on the face of the anticipatory warrant.130 
This is a very small burden to impose on law enforcement in re-
lation to the protection it provides. In light of these considera-
tions, the particularity approach is, therefore, the better choice 
for placing conditions precedent within the Constitutional 
framework. 
Brett R. Hamm 
 
 
 130. Unless the terms are in an affidavit that can properly be considered under 
the cure by affidavit doctrine. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text. 
